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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE REPUBLIC GROUP. INC.. 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
WON-DOOR CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
REED A. WATKINS, 
JAY A. SMART. RON SMART. 
and DOES 1 THROUGH 20, 
Defendants-Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Scott Daniels, District Judge 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from two final orders of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, entered November 4, 1991 and November 5, 1991. 
Appellant The Republic Group, Inc. ("Republic") initially filed the appeal incorrectly 
with this Court on December 3,1991 (No. 910721-CA). On January 15, 1992 this appeal 
1 
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was transferred to the Utah Supreme Court (No. 920029), which had jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(?)(j) (1992). On May 22, 1992, the Utah Supreme 
Court poured over this appeal to this Court for disposition (No. 920330-CA). The 
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this appeal therefore rests upon its pour-over 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The broad issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly concluded that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On 
appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts 
and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion; 
it reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusion that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact.1 Each of the issues below involve the 
determination of mixed issues of law and fact, and therefore the foregoing standard of 
review applies to each of the issues presented below. 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that any and all disputes, 
representations and prior agreements between Won-Door and Republic were merged 
into the August 22, 1986 Agreement. 
•^-Neiderhausar Builders & Development Corp. v. Campbell, 824 
P . 2 d 1193 ( U t a h C t . App. 1 9 9 2 ) . 
2 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the August 22,1986 Agreement 
was the controlling and binding agreement between the parties.2 
3. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Won-Door did not breach the 
August 22, 1986 Agreement. 
4. Did the trial court correctly conclude that no breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing occurred because no contract existed between Republic and Won-
Door at the time of the alleged breach. 
5. Did the trial court correctly conclude that a breach could not have 
occurred in any event on August 22,1986 because the list of qualified buyers had already 
been determined in May of 1986 and were not then negotiable. 
6. Is Republic's claim for promissory estoppel reviewable on appeal where 
it failed to allege such a cause of action in its complaint, and in any event are they 
merged into the August 22, 1986 agreement. 
7. Did the trial court correctly conclude that as a matter of law defendants 
were entitled to summary judgment on Republic's claims for fraud. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
This case was decided on summary judgment. Therefore, Rule 56, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is determinative.3 
2See Record at 415. 
3See Addendum J. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Republic filed its Complaint in this case on June 14, 1988, claiming that 
Defendants owe it a finder's fee for Republic's identification of Thermal Systems, Inc., 
a subsidiary of TS Industries, Inc., the company that eventually purchased all of the stock 
of Won-Door.4 The Complaint alleges three causes of action, breach of contract, breach 
of a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.5 Defendants answered 
the Complaint, denied liability, and affirmatively defended on the basis that all 
negotiations, contacts, discussions, representations, and agreements, if any, relied upon 
by Republic were superseded by the August 22,1986 Agreement which entitled Republic 
to a fee only if Won-Door was sold to one of the companies described in the August 22, 
1986 Agreement, which did not occur.6 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on September 11, 1990.7 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on or about October 16, 1990.8 
On October 30, 1990, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Irvin D. Bird, 
Bryant Cragun and Mark McSwain, which were submitted by Plaintiff in opposition to 
4Record at 2-22. 
5Record at 2-22. 
6Record at 34-54. 
7Record at 97. 
8Record at 492. 
4 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment and in support of its own motion.9 This 
motion was granted in part and denied in part.10 The trial court heard oral argument 
on these motions on August 12, 1991.11 Judge Daniels granted Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.12 
This is an appeal from the District Court's Orders of November 4 and 5, 1991, which 
granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment.13 
9Record at 198 
10Record at 323-25, 337-38. The Affidavit of Bryant Cragun 
which appears in the record (R. 189-95) is neither signed nor 
notarized. As such, it is inadmissible as evidence in this case. 
Rules 11, 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Utah Code Ann. § 78-
26-5 (1990). 
1:IRecord at 350-416. 
12Record at 329-33, 415. 
13Record at 329-33. 
5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are undisputed in the record from the trial court: 
THE PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff-Appellant The Republic Group, Inc. ("Republic") is a Utah 
corporation15 with experience in corporate mergers and in finding investors16, and in 
1988 had been involved in perhaps fifty such transactions.17 
±q
 A review of the Statement of Facts set forth in Republic's 
Brief at pp. 3-14 reveals numerous problems, although none create 
genuine issues of material fact. 
For example, there is no citation to the detailed "facts" 
asserted (some even containing supposed quotations) in Statement of 
Facts Nos. 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34. Most of 
this asserted matter is nowhere in the record. This violates Rule 
24(a)(7), (e) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. State v. Price, 
827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Also, many of the citations are extremely broad, citing to an 
entire 96-page deposition (see footnotes 15, 18), citing to the 
entire 12-page Affidavit of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., the 11-page 
Affidavit of Mark McSwain, and the 7-page unsigned Affidavit of 
Bryant Cragun (see footnotes 2, 5, 6, 9, 22, 24, 25, and 26). 
Worse, a number of the citations do not support or only 
partially support the matter from which they are cited, or contain 
incorrect quotations. See Statement of Facts Nos. 1 (last 
sentence), 3, 9 (see R. 293), 10, 13, 14, 15 (see R. 300), 21 (last 
sentence). 
15Record at 2. 
1 6 Deposi t ion of I rv in D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 5. 
1 7Jd, a t 4 ,9 -10 . 
6 
2. Irvin D. Bird, Jr., ("Bird") was the President of Republic, commencing in 
1985, and at all relevant times thereafter.18 
3. Defendant-Appellee Won-Door Corporation ("Won-Door") is a Utah 
corporation19 which in 1986 was seeking to raise funding through either an initial public 
offering or a private placement of common stock.20 
4. Defendant-Appellee Reed A. Watkins ("Watkins") is a Utah resident and 
in February, 1986, Watkins was appointed as the exclusive agent for Won-Door and its 
shareholders to raise funding for Won-Door and its shareholders in this manner and to 
negotiate and conclude the funding transaction on behalf of Won-Door and its 
shareholders.21 
5. Defendants-Appellees Jay A. Smart and Ron Smart (the "Smarts") were 
shareholders of Won-Door at all times relevant to this case.22 
THE MAY 12, 1986 LETTER AGREEMENT 
6. Watkins contacted Republic in early 1986 and thereafter delivered a letter 
dated March 12, 1986 to Republic which established a nonexclusive broker arrangement 
whereby Republic would earn a $250,000 commission if it funded, through its contacts, 
18Id. at 4. 
19Record a t 2. 
20Record a t 16, 279; See Addendum MA". 
21Record a t 16, 279; See Addendum "A". 
22Record a t 3 . 
7 
176,000 shares (22 percent) of the Won-Door stock at $42.00 per share to be sold by 
members of the Smart family.23 
7. Bird admitted that Watkins' March 12, 1986 letter "became obsolete" 
because its was not possible to sell a 22 percent interest as required by the March 12 
Agreement.24 
DECISION TO USE LARGER COMPANY TO SELL ALL THE STOCK 
8. Because of Republic's inability to sell the 22 percent of Won-Door, the 
shareholders decided to sell all of the Won-Door stock and elected to go with a larger, 
more experienced company to accomplish the sale.25 Republic was aware of this and 
attempted to get Republic to use Drexel, Burnharn & Lambert to handle the sale of all 
the stock of Won-Door.26 
9. On or about April 28, 1986 Won-Door (by Watkins) entered into a written 
contract with Boettcher & Company ("Boettcher") whereby Boettcher was named the 
exclusive sales agent for the sale of all of the Won-Door stock.27 The contract 
specifically excepted ten purchasers previously contacted by intermediaries other than 
Boettcher.28 
23Record a t 17, 280, 298; See Addendum "B". 
2 4Deposi t ion of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 15, 19, 298. 
25Record a t 294, 298; See Addendum " I " . 
26Record a t 299, 481. 
27Record a t 287-92; See Addendum "G" 
28Record a t 290. 
8 
THE LIST OF QUALIFIED BUYERS 
10. On May 12, 1986, Bryant Cragun, an associate of Republic's, sent a letter 
to Republic stating his suggestions for the list of ten qualified buyers to be excluded 
from the Boettcher contract.29 
11. In a letter from Republic to Watkins dated May 21, 198630, Republic 
listed itself and ten other companies which would be excepted from the Boettcher 
agreement.31 
12. Watkins gave the May 21 list to Boettcher, which accepted it and agreed 
that the companies on that list would be excepted from the Boettcher contract, even 
though there were 11 names including Republic.32 
DISAGREEMENTS PRIOR TO THE AUGUST 22 AGREEMENT 
13. Prior to preparation of its May 21, 1986 letter, Republic took "extreme 
disagreement" with Watkins in being limited "to only ten companies", 33 and Bird was 
having continuing disagreement with Watkins "Maybe once or twice a week, yes. 
Whenever we met v/e discussed this issue." M 
29Record a t 293; See Addendum "H". 
30Record a t 18, 281. 
3 1Deposit ion of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 27. Record a t 
299; See Addenda "C" and "G"; a l so see Deposi t ion of I rv in D. Bird, 
J r . , Vol. I I , a t 5-6. 
32Record a t 300. 
3 3Deposit ion of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 28. 
34Id. a t 28. 
9 
14. Bird also testified with respect to time period the week or so before the 
May 21 letter was sent to Watkins: 
. . .unbeknownst to us, he [Watkins] had made arrangements with 
Boettcher to also work on this merger activity, but his arrangement with 
Boettcher excluded only ten slots. And we had some great disagreements 
with Reed about that, and I guess those disagreements still stand. 
We prepared a list; he said, Just give me a list of ten that we can 
omit from our agreement with Boettcher. And much to our dismay we 
had to do that-or wanted to accommodate Reed to do that even though 
other companies that we were working with that were interested 
candidates were left off this list, and our continuing argument with Reed 
was, what if the other people buy the company, what about our fee 
arrangements? And those issues were never resolved, never resolved. 
And that occasioned this Exhibit 2, our letter of May 21st to Reed 
Watkins.35 
15. Bird and his partners, Fred Volcansek and Mark McSwain, "hammered at 
Reed and hammered at Reed, and my partners were insistent" on getting a written fee 
agreement, and although there had been numerous discussions with Watkins about 
"another fee arrangement when the whole company was sold", the documents "don't 
contain anything in concrete. There was never an agreement definitely as to what the 
fee agreement clearly was outside of as it relates to the whole 30 companies that we'd 
worked with."36 
16. Bird testified that prior to the May 21, 1986 letter, Republic protested to 
Watkins about the agreement Watkins made with Boettcher.37 
35Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 
36Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 36 (emphasis 
added). 
37Id. at 39. 
10 
17. In the early months after the expiration of the March 12,1986 Agreement, 
Watkins refused to give Republic a fee agreement in writing.38 
18. Bird had numerous discussions with Watkins about the Lehman formula 
[calculated on a graduated basis] as the basis for payment of a fee, but admitted that 
prior to August 22, 1986, "We never, ever came to a solid fee arrangement as it relates 
to all of the companies on all of the lists that we had worked with. . ,."39 
19. Bird claimed there were some nonspecific verbal agreements with Watkins 
in regard to the fee,40 but in response to further questioning directed at the time period 
from the expiration of the March 12, 1986 Agreement and the May 21, 1986 letter, Bird 
admitted that there was no resolution about what the fee would be: 
O [By Mr. Faber] But there was never any resolution as to what that fee 
would be? 
No, there never was. 41 
38Id. a t 50 . 
39 Id. a t 51 
4 0 I d . a t 51 
41Id. a t 52, 
11 
MAY 27. 1986 LETTER 
20. On or about May 27, 1986 Bird prepared a handwritten list of fifteen 
companies.42 He testified that he prepared this letter because of the continuing 
argument with Watkins with whom Bird was "furious".43 
21. Bird told Watkins that if any of the companies listed on the May 27, 1986 
list became the purchaser of the Won-Door stock, Republic would have earned a fee, 
but admitted that "He [Watkins] didn't agree."44 
22. Bird testified that he told Watkins that Thermal Systems, Inc., one of the 
companies named on Bird's May 27, 1986 list (and the subsidiary of the ultimate 
purchaser in October, 1986 of all the Won-Door stock)45 "was a very poor company, 
one that he [Watkins] shouldn't deal with."46 
23. Bird said that Watkins did not agree to anything on the list on May 27, 
1986 and testified as follows: 
Q Now at the time you were in your office and writing this up with 
Mr. Watkins present and you were a little unhappy with him, at 
that point in time, was there any conversation about what he was 
going to do with this list? 
42Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 52; Record at 
282-283; See Addendum "D", 
43Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 53. 
^
4Id. at 56 (emphasis added). 
45Record at 300-01 . 
46Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 60; see 
Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. II, at 39-40. 
12 
A No. He just wanted to know who the other companies that I was arguing 
about were, so that's what I told him. 
Q And you didn't agree to anything on this list, he just said. Give me the list? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q You've got to answer yes or no. 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And so you gave him the list and he left, I take it? 
A That's correct. 
Q Do you know what he did with the list thereafter? 
A No. I don't have a remote idea . . .47 
LIST OF TEN QUALIFIED COMPANIES 
24. In August, 1986 Republic instructed its attorney, Douglas J. Parry [an 
associate of Dan Berman], to send Watkins a letter which was dated August 20, 1986,48 
in regard to the identity of the companies for which Republic could claim a fee if Won-
Door was sold to any of such companies, and to conclude a fee agreement between 
Republic and Won-Door.49 Parry's letter mentions Leucadia and the other ten 
companies listed on the May 21, 1986 letter.50 
4 7Deposit ion of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 62-63 (emphasis 
added) . 
48Record a t 284-85. 
49Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 64; See 
Addendum "E". 
50Record at 284-85; See Addendum "E". 
13 
BIRD'S ADMISSION OF NO AGREEMENT PRIOR TO AUGUST 22 
25. Bird said that the reason for sending the Parry letter was because "we had 
no fee agreement; and we demanded, absolutely demanded a fee agreement And 
so this letter was written in an attempt to get some kind of a comprehensive agreement 
together listing all of the companies that we had brought."51 
26. Prior to the Parry letter of August 20, 1986, Bird told Parry "we didn't have 
an arrangement [with Watkins], the arrangement was yet to be worked out, . . ,"52 
27. Bird also said that "we had no fee agreement: and we demanded, 
absolutely demanded a fee agreement or we would make sure that the offer [from 
Leucadia] wasn't forthcoming,"53 and that "we've got to do something or we'll make 
sure that Leucadia doesn't [make an] offer."54 
28. Bird further testified concerning the Parry letter in regard to the fee as 
follows: 
Q (By Mr. Faber) Second [paragraph of Parry's letter]. That's the one that 
has the formula for the fee in it? 
A My understanding is that-well, I don't know what his understanding was. 
I don't think there was an understanding of anyone at this point. 
51Depositicn of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 65 (emphasis 
added). 
^
2Id. at 70 (emphasis added). 
s3Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
5
*Id. at 71 (emphasis added). 
14 
Q So there was no agreement at this point in writing as to any fee? 
A Not in writing, but there would have been a lot of discussions with Reed 
as to what the fee ought to be or should be or could be.^5 
29. Bird further evidences the fact that there was no agreement prior to 
August 22, 1986 by testifying that he told Parry in August that there was a 
misunderstanding as to the fee and that "He [Parry] knew the whole thing was a 
misunderstanding."56 
THE AUGUST 22. 1986 AGREEMENT 
30. Bird stated that Watkins had an immediate reaction when he received 
Parry's letter of August 20, 1986 and on August 22, 1986 "stormed into our [Republic's] 
office."57 Bird and McSwain were present and there were "a couple [of] hours of 
disagreement."58 
31. In Mid-August, Republic and Won-Door expected that Leucadia would be 
making an offer to buy all the stock of Won-Door.59 Watkins wanted to get things 
resolved and did not want to have a misunderstanding over the computation of the fee 
if Leucadia (one of Republic's ten qualified purchasers) should make an offer.60 The 
S5Id. a t 76 (emphas is a d d e d ) . 
seId. a t 77 . 
5 7Id. a t 80 . 
SQId. a t 82 . 
5 9 Record a t 302. 
6 0 D e p o s i t i c n of I r v i n D. B i r d , J r . , Vol . I , a t 82 . 
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parties agreed that Republic was to be compensated on the "Lehman Formula" if any 
company named on the May 21, 1986 list was the purchaser of Won-Door.61 
32. At the meeting on August 22, 1986, Bird stated that Watkins was furious 
with the suggestion that Republic's attorney, Dan Berman, might sue him, and Watkins 
insisted that Republic and Watkins get something in writing and basically gave Republic 
an ultimatum to that effect.62Watkins wanted to get a fee agreement resolved and in 
writing because Leucadia appeared close to making an offer.63 
33. Bird then said, "Good, let's get a fee [agreement] written. I've been asking 
for a fee now for months and months and months, a fee agreement that covers all of our 
work. My partners, Reed, want something in writing and you and I have done everything 
off the cuff for seven months."64 
34. At the August 22, 1986 meeting Bird and McSwain had a long argument 
with Watkins regarding the identity of the companies and a fee agreement and even 
though they did not want to sign the August 22, 1986 handwritten agreement,65 Bird 
testified that Watkins said, "If you don't sign this agreement you'll have no agreement 
whatever."66 
61ia. 
62Id. a t 90. 
"Record a t 302. 
6 4Deposi t ion of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 90. 
65Record a t 2 1 , 286; See Addendum "F". 
6 6Deposi t ion of I r v i n D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 82. 
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35. Prior to the August 22, 1986 meeting Bird knew that Watkins was 
conducting negotiations with some other possible purchaser but didn't know with 
whom.67 Watkins refused to tell Republic at the meeting with whom he was 
negotiating. In fact, Bird said that Watkins told them that it was none of their 
business.68 
36. Also on August 22, 1986, Watkins told Bird and McSwain that the only 
basis on which Republic would receive a fee would be according to the August 22, 1986 
handwritten agreement, and Watkins refused to give them any other information about 
any other possible buyer with whom Watkins was dealing.69 
37. Bird and McSwain on behalf of Republic then signed the August 22, 1986 
agreement70 because they thought that Leucadia [one of the companies named on the 
May 21, 1986 list], was going to make a cash offer to buy the Won-Door stock.71 
38. Bird's expectation that Leucadia was going to buy was a result of Bird's 
conversation with Mr. Pinnock, a representative of Leucadia.72 Bird said Watkins never 
61
 Id. at 70. 
68Id. at 75, 83. 
69Id. at 95. 
70See Addendum nFM. 
71Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 91-93; see 
Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. II, at 32. 
72Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 91-93. 
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told Republic what was going on with Leucadia, and "We got everything from 
Leucadia."73 
SALE OF WON-DOOR STOCK 
39. Won-Door's stock was sold to TS Industries, Inc. in October, 1986.74 The 
sale was made on an installment basis, and was partly for cash and partly for stock. 
Ultimately, TS Industries, Inc. defaulted, and the stock was bought back from the 
bankruptcy court by the original stockholders of Won-Door. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE MARCH 12,1986 AGREEMENT EXPIRED AND NO 
OTHER CONTRACT WAS IN EFFECT BETWEEN 
REPUBLIC AND WON-DOOR UNTIL THEY ENTERED 
INTO THE AUGUST 22, 1986 AGREEMENT 
A. The March 12, 1986 Agreement Was Terminated 
There are two written contracts alleged in the Verified Complaint in this case. 
The March 12, 1986 Letter, which applied only to a sale of 22 percent of the Won-Door 
stock, and the August 22, 1986 Agreement, which applied to the sale of all the stock and 
which would have entitled Republic to a commission if the stock was sold to certain 
identified companies. By Republic's own admission, the March 12, 1986 Agreement 
became "obsolete" and expired. Won-door was then free to enter into a new agreement 
73Id. a t 84. 
7 4 Deposi t ion of I rv in D. Bi rd , J r . , Vol. I I , a t 36. 
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with Boettcher for the sale of all the stock, which it did. Pursuant to the Boettcher 
Agreement ten qualified contacts of Republic were excluded. 
B. The March 12, 1986 Agreement Was Not Modified, Nor Was Any 
New Agreement Entered Into Between Won-Door and Republic Until August, 1986 
The undisputed evidence in this case establishes that after Republic determined 
that it could not market 22 percent of the stock of Won-Door, an agreement was entered 
into with Boettcher to sell all of the stock. By Bird's own admissions, an agreement was 
not reached until August 22, 1986 with respect to the formula for payment of a 
commission fee to Republic in the event the stock was sold to one of its ten qualified 
contacts (identified by Republic to Won-Door in a letter dated May 21, 1986). There 
was clearly no meeting of the minds prior to August 22, 1986, when a definitive 
agreement between the parties was finally reached. 
II. 
REPUBLIC BID NOT ALLEGE ESTOPPEL AS A CAUSE 
OF ACTION IN ITS COMPLAINT AND ITS CLAIMS OF 
ESTOPPEL ARE THEREFORE NOT REVIEWABLE 
The Verified Complaint in this case alleges only three causes of action: breach 
of contract breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. 
Promissory estoppel is not pleaded. Accordingly, Republic's claim for promissory 
estoppel is not reviewable on appeal. 
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HI. 
THE AUGUST 22, 1986 AGREEMENT IS THE 
CONTROLLING AGREEMENT BETWEEN REPUBLIC 
AND WON-DOOR 
A. The August 22, 1986 Agreement Was Valid and Binding 
The August 22, 1986 Agreement meets all the requirements for a valid and 
binding contract under Utah law. The defenses raised by Republic to assert its invalidity 
have no merit. 
B. Any Disputes, Representations or Agreements Prior to 
August 22, 1986 Were Merged into the Agreement of that Date and Constituted an 
Accord and Satisfaction 
The August 22, 1986 handwritten agreement was clearly intended by the parties 
to settle a long-standing and heated dispute over whether Republic would be entitled to 
a finder's fee, and if so, what the formula for the fee would be. Thus, any prior dispute, 
representation or even agreement was either incorporated in the August 22, 1986 
agreement or superseded. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between 
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary 
judgment where there are no genuine issue of material fact. As to materiality, only 
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 
properly preclude the entry of summaxy judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant 
or unnecessary will not be counted. Accordingly, any factual disputes that may have 
existed between the parties prior to August 22, 1986 are immaterial since they are 
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merged in to the August 22, 1986 Agreement and are therefore not outcome 
determinative. 
C. The Ten Listed Qualified Companies" Are Clearly Identifiable 
The May 21, 1986 Letter from Republic to Won-Door is the only letter that 
contains the name of ten companies contacted by Republic. (The list contains eleven 
names with Republic's name on the list). Watkins gave the May 21 list to Boettcher, 
which accepted it and agreed that the companies on that list would be excepted from the 
Boettcher contract. The May 21 list is also the only possible letter that Republic's 
attorney, Douglas J. Parry, could have been referring to in his letter of August 20, 1986. 
Accordingly, Republic's argument that this term of the August 22, 1986 Agreement is 
undefined or indefinite is without merit. 
D. Won-Door Did Not Breach the August 22, 1986 Agreement 
There was no breach of the August 22, 1986 agreement because TS Industries, 
Inc., the company to which the stock of Won-Door was ultimately sold, was not one of 
the companies listed in the May 21, 1986 letter. The last sentence of the August 22, 
1986 agreement states that "Other than above [the list of qualified contacts], Republic 
Group entitled to no fee." This Agreement does away with all of Republic's claims 
since the company to which the Won-Door was ultimately sold was not on the list. 
The August 22, 1986 Agreement does allow a $5,000 fee to Republic if the Won-
Door was sold to a non-qualified contact of Republic. The stock was, in fact sold to a 
non-qualified contact and Republic was tendered the $5,000, but refused to accept it. 
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Won-Door has therefore fully performed its duties under the Agreement and is not in 
breach. 
IV. 
PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF THE AUGUST 22, 1986 
AGREEMENT, WON-DOOR HAD NO CONTRACT WITH 
REPUBLIC AND THEREFORE NO DUTY OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING EXISTED BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES; AFTER THE FORMATION OF THE AUGUST 
22, 1986 AGREEMENT, THERE WAS NO BREACH OF 
ANY DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
A. The Covenant of Good Faith Arises Only After the Contract 
is Formed Because the Covenant is Defined by the Contract at Issue 
A party's duty of good faith and fair dealing is defined by the terms and 
conditions of the contract. Therefore, the duty does not arise until the contract is 
formed. Each of the matteis asserted by Republic as a breach of this duty were matters 
that allegedly occurred prior to the formation of the Agreement on August 22, 1986. 
B. Won-Door Did Not Breach Any Duty of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing Under the August 22, 1986 Agreement 
Each of the matters asserted by Republic as a breach of the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing were matters that allegedly occurred prior to the formation of the 
Agreement on August 22, 1986, Therefore, Republic has no cause of action for breach 
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
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V. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON REPUBLICS CLAIM FOR FRAUD 
A. Watkins Had No Duty to Speak 
In order to establish a claim for fraud where the assertion is that the defendant 
failed to disclose a material matter, the defendant must have a duty to speak. The only 
basis alleged by Republic for which Watkins would have had a duty to speak is the 
alleged existence of a confidential relationship. As a matter of law there was no 
confidential relationship between Bird and Watkins, nor between Republic and 
Defendants. 
B. Any Allegedly Omitted Fact Would Have Made No Difference 
Republic incorrectly claims that Watkins committed fraud by failing to disclose 
who it was dealing with. This argument is misplaced because Republic had already 
picked its list of ten qualified contacts on May 21, 1986. Doug Parry's letter of August 
20, 1986, which attempted to resolve the fee issue on behalf of Republic, referred to this 
same list. This list could not be changed at will. To do so would have subjected 
Defendants to liability for breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing under its 
contract with Boettcher, who earned and was paid a commission on the sale to TS 
Industries, Inc. As a result, the claimed omission is totally immaterial. 
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C. Watkins Made No Misrepresentation 
The only person whom Republic claims made misrepresentations is Watkins. The 
case against Watkins is barred by the bankruptcy proceedings which are the subject of 
a Motion to Dismiss presently before this court. Furthermore, Defendants strongly 
believe that Watkins did nothing wrong and that he did not make any misrepresentation. 
Republic has alleged that defendants committed fraud by repeatedly assuring Republic 
that it did not need a contract and by not informing Republic of negotiations with TS 
Industries, Inc. Republic claims that Watkins, when asked about who he was dealing 
with other than Leucadia said it was not a company on Republic's list. There was 
no false statement of a presently existing material fact because TS Industries, Inc., one 
of the companies Won-Door was dealing with, was not on the list of qualified contacts. 
Indeed, it was not on any list provided by Republic. To disclose any information to 
Republic may have exposed Won-Door to a claim by Boettcher for breach of duty. 
Also, there was no justifiable reliance by Republic. Bird's continual efforts to get 
a contract demonstrate that he knew one was necessary. Bird testified repeatedly about 
the continuous and heated dispute with Watkins during the whole period of time and 
about Republic's refusal to accept anything but a written contract. The list of qualified 
contacts was already established back on May 21, 1986. Bird and McSwain on behalf 
of Republic then signed the agreement.. Thus, there clearly could not be any reliance. 
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VI. 
REPUBLIC'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS MOOTED BY THE COURTS GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS 
The denial of a motion for partial summary judgment is a non-appealable order. 
The relief sought by Republic's motion for partial summary judgment is the mirror image 
of the relief granted to defendants. Because the trial court properly granted Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, as shown by this Brief, Republic's appeal on this issue 
is not well taken, and the trial court's order should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE MARCH 12, 1986 AGREEMENT EXPIRED AND NO 
OTHER CONTRACT WAS IN EFFECT BETWEEN 
REPUBLIC AND WON-DOOR UNTIL THEY ENTERED 
INTO THE AUGUST 22, 1986 AGREEMENT 
A. The March 12, 1986 Agreement Was Terminated. 
The Verified Complaint in this case asserts that there were two written contracts. 
The first was Watkins' letter of March 12, 198675 which applied only to a sale of 22 
percent of the Won-Door stock at a price of $42.00 per share.76 The second contract 
was the one-page handwritten agreement of August 22, 1986 which applied to a sale of 
all the Won-Door stock and would entitle Republic to a commission if the stock was sold 
to certain identified companies.77 The Verified Complaint contains admissions by 
Republic that the August 22, 1986 Agreement was an agreement between the parties.78 
By Republic's own admission, the earlier letter agreement between Republic and 
Won-Door of March 12, 1986 became "obsolete" when Republic concluded it was 
7 5 Record a t 280; Addendum " B " . 
76Addendum "B" , 
77Addendum " F " . 
7 8 Record a t 7, p a r a g r a p h 2 4 . 
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impractical or impossible to sell a 22 percent interest in a closely held company.9 Mr. 
Bird testified in his deposition with respect to the March 12, 1986 Agreement as follows: 
In fact, this document became very obsolete. This was a document 
where we defined a 22 percent investor in Won-Door for which we were 
to be paid $250,000. This document became obsolete when it was 
determined that Won-Door would entertain a sale for the entire 
on 
corporation . . .. 
Won-Door and its shareholders decided in April of 1986 to sell all of the stock 
of Won-Door. Because the prior contract was terminated, defendants were free at that 
time to enter into a new agreement with another company for the sale of all the stock 
of Won-Door. The individual defendants decided to sell all of the their Won-Door stock 
and employed a larger, more experienced company (Boettcher) for that purpose.81 
Republic was aware of this and attempted to get Republic to use Drexel, Burnham & 
Lambert to handle the sale of all the stock of Won-Door.82 
B. The March 12, 1986 Agreement Was Not Modified, Nor Was 
Any New Agreement Entered Into Between Won-Door and Republic Until August, 1986. 
Republic's First Cause of Action in its Verified Complaint attempts to allege a 
vague, composite, ongoing contract between the date the March 12, 1986 became 
obsolete and October 27, 1986, when all of the Won-Door Stock was sold.83 This could 
79Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 15, 19. 
80Record at 19. 
8 iRecord a t 287-92; See Addendum "G". 
82Record a t 299, 481. 
S3See Record a t 9-10. 
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have occurred, however, only if the March 12, 1986 Agreement was modified or an 
entirely new contract was entered into between the parties. A contract may only be 
modified by the parties observing the same requisites necessary to form a new contract. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that to establish a contract (and as a condition 
precedent to its enforcement) there must be a meeting of the minds which must be 
shown with sufficient definiteness to establish all the essential terms of the contract. 
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc.. 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976).84 As the 
undisputed facts, from the mouth of Republic's own key witness, demonstrate, there was 
no meeting of the minds between Republic and Won-Door from the time the March 12, 
1986 Agreement expired in April until August 22, 1986. 
There is no doubt that the August 22, 1986 handwritten agreement was not a 
confirmation of an earlier meeting of the minds regarding any definite contract terms, 
but was at most the resolution of a stormy relationship which up to that time had been 
a long standing, continuous and acrimonious dispute. Bird testified in his first deposition 
that the relationship between Republic and Watkins on numerous occasions prior to 
August 22, 1986 involved "great disagreements"85, "extreme disagreements"86, 
~
4See also B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 
P.2d 1216 (Utah 1972); Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 
597 (Utah 1962); John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City 
Corporation, 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987). 
85Deposition of Irvin D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 27. 
seId. at 28. 
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"continuing argument"87, "dispute"88, "heated discussions"89, "words with Reed"90, and 
"misunder-standings"91, and the payment of and amount of any such fee. Furthermore, 
Bird said that he and his partners were "furious"92 and "unhappy"93 with Watkins 
because Watkins refused to tell them with whom he was negotiating at any time and also 
refused to sign an agreement with Republic until August 22, 1986. 
Bird also testified that in May, 1986 Republic did not want to be limited to only 
ten companies, that "those issues were never resolved, never resolved"94 prior to August 
22, 1986. Nor was there any definitive agreement on essential terms. Bird further 
testified: "There was never an agreement definitely as to what the fee agreement was."95 
He also testified that in August, 1986 prior to Parry's letter of August 20, 1986 to 
Watkins that Bird told Parry "we had no fee agreement; and we demanded, absolutely 
demanded a fee agreement" from Watkins.96 Bird said that as a consequence of Parry's 
August 20, 1986 letter, Watkins "stormed" into Republic's office and after two hours of 
87 Id. at 27, 52, 83. 
88Id. at 47. 
89Id. at 50. 
90Id. at 50, 
91Id. at 77. 
92 Id. at 55, 
93Id. at 92 
94Id. at 27. 
95Id. at 36. 
9eId. at 55. 
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disagreement and argument, Republic and Watkins signed the August 22, 1986 
handwritten agreement97 to which was attached Republic's letter of May 21, 1986, 
which lists Leucadia and the ten other companies, on which Republic would receive a 
fee if any of those companies purchased the stock of Won-Door.98 
Courts will not remake a contract for the parties. In Pingree the parties disputed 
the amount of rent which should be charged when a lease was renewed. The agreement 
contained express terms for determining the amount, but the application of the factors 
listed in the agreement was ambiguous and each party argued for a different result. The 
reviewing court reversed the trial court which had determined the parties intended a 
reasonable rent, because the trial court's interpretation, "had the effect of nullifying the 
express factors specified by the parties, and substituting a new agreement to which the 
parties had not committed themselves."99 The Utah Supreme Court therefore 
determined the option to renew was too vague and indefinite to be enforceable. 
From Bird's own testimony there was clearly no meeting of the minds prior to 
August 22, 1986, nor any definite agreement on any subject. Therefore, once the March 
12, 1986 Agreement became obsolete and terminated, there was no other contract 
between the parties until the handwritten agreement of August 22, 1986. Republic's 
letter of May 21, 1986 was then made a part of the August 22, 1986 handwritten 
97Id. a t 80-82. 
98Record at 18. 
" 5 5 8 P.2d a t 1321. 
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agreement which clearly settled any dispute as to the identity of the as to which Republic 
would be entitled to a fee and the formula for the fee. 
II. 
REPUBLIC DID NOT ALLEGE ESTOPPEL AS A CAUSE 
OF ACTION IN ITS COMPLAINT AND ITS CLAIMS OF 
ESTOPPEL ARE THEREFORE NOT REVIEWABLE 
Republic has claimed in its brief that defendants should be estopped from denying 
"the validity of the March 12, 1986 Agreement" and from denying "that a fee based upon 
a reasonable application of the March 12, 1986 Agreement is due Republic."100 
However, a cause of action for promissory estoppel was not asserted in the Verified 
Complaint; instead, Republic asserted only three causes of action: breach of contract, 
breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.101 
In Shire Development v. Frontier Investments,102 this court considered an 
appeal from a summary judgment granted by Judge Daniels in which a similar new issue 
was not raised by the pleadings below. There, the plaintiffs (joint venturers of the 
purchaser) challenged the validity of a liquidated damages provision in a real estate 
contract. The court held that the joint venture agreement did not constitute an 
assignment of the purchaser's interest in the real estate contract and that, although 
plaintiffs had paid over $80,000 of the purchase price, they did not have standing to 
^ A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief , a t 35. 
101Record a t 9-13. 
102799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990). 
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bring an action on the contract. Plaintiffs argued for the first time on appeal an 
alternate theory that if they did not have privity of contract, they still had standing to 
bring an equitable cause of action to recover money they paid under the real estate 
contract. The court stated: 
Appellants raise several equitable arguments, including "equitable 
relief from the unconscionable penalty," "equitable action to recover 
money," and partial performance. None of these arguments were made to 
the trial court except "equitable action to recover money," and it was 
raised only briefly in the oral argument by appellants on Frontier's motion 
for summary judgment and thus was not sufficiently preserved for appeal. 
As we have reiterated many times, we will not consider an issue raised on 
appeal for the first time,,103 
Similarly, in Thayer v. Gushing,104 the Utah Supreme Court applied the same 
rule and stated: 
Defendant raises this point for the first time on appeal. He did not 
present to the trial court the question of whether the oral agreement was 
a separate contract or a modification of the written agreement. In fact, 
the case was tried by both parties upon the assumption that the oral 
agreement was a modification of the written agreement and was therefore 
a part of it. Issues not presented to the trial court for decision are not 
reviewable by this Court, and we express no opinion on the issue. 10° 
In the instant case, since promissory estoppel was not pleaded below as a cause 
of action, this issue is not reviewable on appeal. 
103799 P.2d at 224 (emphasis added), citing Heiner v. S.J. 
Groves & Sons Co., 7790 P. 2d 107, 115 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Mascaro 
v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 1987). 
104688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), 
100Id. at 857 (emphasis added; citation omitted). See also 
Bundy v. Century Equipment Company, Inc., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 
1984)("matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at 
the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal"). 
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III. 
THE AUGUST 22, 1986 AGREEMENT IS THE 
CONTROLLING AGREEMENT BETWEEN REPUBLIC 
AND WON-DOOR 
A The August 22, 1986 Agreement Was Valid and Binding. 
Won-Door and Republic had numerous disputes after the March 12, 1986 
Agreement became obsolete. On August 20, 1986 Doug Parry sent a letter attempting 
to set forth the agreement of the parties. However, Watkins had an "immediate 
reaction" to Parry's letter and went over to Republic's offices to resolve the matter. 
According to Bird's own testimony he stated his intent at the meeting as follows: "Good, 
let's get a fee [agreement] written. I've been asking for a fee now for months and 
months and months, a fee agreement that covers all of our work. My partners, Reed, 
want something in writing and you and I have done everything off the cuff for seven 
months."101 After a couple of hours of discussion, Bird, McSwain and Watkins came 
to an agreement for Republic and Won-Door, respectively, which they embodied in the 
August 22, 1986 Agreement. It clearly reflects their intent to set forth a fee agreement 
and ends by stating: "Other than above, Republic Group entitled to no fee/102 
1 0 1Deposi t ion of I rv in D. Bird, J r . , Vol. I , a t 9(K 
102See Addendum F. 
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Republic has asserted defenses to the validity of the August 22, 1986 Agreement, which 
are addressed elsewhere in this Brief.103 
B. Any Disputes, Representations or Agreements Prior to August 
22,1986 Were Merged into the Agreement of that Date and Constituted an Accord and 
Satisfaction. 
Republic has alleged that there were numerous disputes, representations and even 
promises during the period from March, 1986 to August, 1986. In circumstances where 
parties enter into a written agreement after negotiations and disputes, the written 
agreement is the settlement of their respective claims. In Weight v. Miller,104 the 
plaintiff sued to enforce a promissory note which was signed by the defendant to settle 
a prior dispute. The note stated that it was to be paid in money. The defendant alleged 
that the note had been executed as only part of the transaction and that the note was 
to be paid in stock rather than money. The trial court rejected defendant's argument 
and entered a money judgment in plaintiffs favor. Defendant appealed, and in affirming 
the money judgment the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
. . . wherever there are negotiations between parties and they thereafter 
execute a writing in regard to it, it is generally to be presumed that it 
represents that settlement of their respective claims. This is especially 
103Republic' s claim as to voidness of the August 22, 1986 
Agreement based upon the alleged breach of duty of good faith and 
fair dealing and based upon misrepresentation are dealt with in 
Sections IV and V of this Brief. Republic's claims as to voidness 
for failure of the parties to have a meeting of the minds as to the 
identity of the ten qualified companies is treated in Section III-C 
of this Brief. 
10416 Utah 2d 112, 396 P.2d 626 (Utah 1964). 
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true when there has been disagreement and disputation between 
them.105 
In Mawhinney v. Jensen,106 the Utah Supreme Court also explained that the 
terms of a final contract govern preliminary contracts if there are ambiguities and all 
prior terms are merged into the final contract, unless it can be clearly shown that the 
final terms, because of inadvertence, ambiguity or fraud, do not represent the intention 
of the parties.107 
The August 22, 1986 handwritten agreement was clearly intended by the parties 
to settle a long-standing and heated dispute over whether Republic would be entitled to 
a finder's fee if all the stock was sold, and if so, what the formula for the fee would be, 
and the identity of the potential purchasers regarding whom Republic would be paid a 
fee. Thus, any prior dispute, representation or even agreement was either incorporated 
in the August 22, 1986 agreement or superseded. Specifically, any differences regarding 
the payment of a finders fee, including the formula to arrive at such fee, and the identity 
of the qualified contacts identified by Republic pursuant to the Boettcher contract were 
resolved by and merged into the August 22, 1986 Agreement. 
All of the matters raised by Republic's complaint were resolved in the August 22, 
1986 Agreement. As cited in the Statement of Facts herein, there was constant 
105396 P.2d at 627 (emphasis added). 
106120 Utah 142, 232 P.2d 769 (Utah 1951)-
107See also State Bank of Sevier v. American Cement and Plaster 
Co., 80 Utah 250, 10 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1932); Halloran-Judge Trust 
Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342 (Utah 1927). 
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disagreement and dispute as to Republic's entitlement to a fee and the formula for such 
fee. All of these disputes were resolved by the parties in the August 22, 1986 
Agreement. This constitutes an accord and satisfaction, which merges all previous 
disputes into the August 22, 1986 Agreement.108 Accordingly, all claims of Republic 
must stand or fall under the August 22, 1986 Agreement. 
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.109 the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed in depth 
the purpose of summary judgment and the appropriate application of the Rule 56 
standard that a moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the matters before the 
court show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The Court stated: 
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of 
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an 
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the 
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. 
As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are 
material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the 
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 
judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be 
counted.110 
1UbSee Weight v. Miller, 16 Utah 2d 112, 396 P.2d 626 (Utah 
1964); State Bank of Sevier v. American Cement and Plaster Co., 80 
Utah 250, 10 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1932); Halloran-Judge Trust Co. v. 
Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342 (Utah 1927). 
109477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (U.S. 1986). 
110Id. at 247-48 (emphasis in the original in the first quoted 
paragraph; emphasis added in the second quoted paragraph). See 
also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 91 L. Ed. 265, 106 S. 
Ct. 2548 (U.S. 1986). 
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According to this standard, any factual issues which might have existed prior to 
the parties entering into the August 22, 1986 Agreement are immaterial since they are 
merged into the agreement and are therefore not outcome determinative. Judge Daniels 
acknowledged this in granting summary judgment in this case when he said: 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think it [plaintiffs showing on 
summary judgment] is very thick. I think that it is possible to read the 
affidavits in such a wav as to create an issue of some kind, but it is a small 
one. It is a thin one. 
I think the logical way to look at the August handwritten fee 
agreement is that is setting the amount of the agreement. It is clear it is 
setting it only as to those ten contacts. And based on the other evidence, 
I think it is pretty clear that those ten contacts, when the list was supplied 
in April, were intended to be the ones that would entitle Republic for a 
fee. 
If there is a case here, it is not enough, I think, to get by a motion 
under the newer standard for summary judgment, and I think under the 
circumstances I am going to grant the Motion for Summary Judgment of 
the defendants . . ..m 
C. The "Ten Listed Qualified Companies" Are Clearly Identifiable. 
The May 21, 1986 Letter from Republic to Won-Door is the only letter that 
contains the name of ten companies contacted by Republic. (The list contains eleven 
names with Republic's name on the list). Watkins gave the May 21 list to Boettcher, 
which accepted it and agreed that the companies on that list would be excepted from the 
Boettcher contract, even though there were 11 names including Republic.112 The May 
21 list is also the only possible letter that Republic's attorney, Douglas J. Parry, could 
Record at 415. 
Record at 300. 
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have been referring to in his letter of August 20, 1986, when he referred to "Leucadia 
and the other qualified ten listed companies. . ..Ml13 Accordingly, Republic's 
argument that this term of the August 22, 1986 Agreement is undefined or indefinite is 
without merit. 
D. Won-Door Did Not Breach the August 22, 1986 Agreement, 
There has been no breach of the August 22, 1986 agreement because TS 
Industries, Inc., the company to which the stock of Won-Door was ultimately sold, was 
not one of the companies listed in the May 21, 1986 letter.114 The last sentence of the 
August 22, 1986 agreement states that "Other than above [the list of qualified contacts], 
Republic Group entitled to no fee." This Agreement does away with all of Republic's 
claims since the company to which the Won-Door was ultimately sold was not on the 
list.115 This is tacitly admitted by Republic's desperate attempt to distance itself from 
the August 22, 1986 Agreement and its effort to resurrect and drastically modify (after 
the fact) the March 12, 1986 Agreement. 
113Record at 284. Again, excluding the name of Republic, there 
are 10 names on the May 21, 1986 list. See Record at 18, 281. 
114It is further significant that TS Industries, Inc. was never 
listed by Republic on any list, nor was it contacted by Republic. 
Republic did list a contact with Thermal Systems, Inc., but not on 
the list of 10 qualified contacts in its May 21, 1986 letter 
pursuant to the Boettcher contract. Thermal Systems, Inc. was a 
subsidiary of TS Industries, Inc. (Record at 300), whom Republic 
strongly discouraged Won-Door from pursuing. Deposition of Irvin 
D. Bird, Jr., Vol. I, at 60. 
115Record at 21. 
38 
The August 22, 1986 Agreement does allow a $5,000 fee to Republic if the Won-
Door was sold to a non-qualified contact of Republic. The stock was, in fact sold to a 
non-qualified contact and Republic was tendered the $5,000, but refused to accept it. 
Won-Door has therefore fully performed its duties under the Agreement and is not in 
breach. 
IV. 
PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF THE AUGUST 22, 1986 
AGREEMENT, WON-DOOR HAD NO CONTRACT WITH 
REPUBLIC AND THEREFORE NO DUTY OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING EXISTED BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES; AFTER THE FORMATION OF THE AUGUST 
22, 1986 AGREEMENT, THERE WAS NO BREACH OF 
ANY DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
Plaintiff-appellant's second cause of action claims that defendants allegedly 
breached the implied covenant to deal in good faith under the handwritten agreement 
of August 22, 1986 by not including TS Industries (the ultimate purchaser of the Won-
Door stock) as one of the possible purchasing companies for which Republic would be 
entitled to a fee. 
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A. The Covenant of Good Faith Arises Only After the Contract is 
Formed Because the Covenant is Defined by the Contract at Issue. 
In St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital116 the Utah 
Supreme Court stated 
In this state, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in 
most, if not all, contractual relationships. . . . For commercial contracts, 
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is statutorily imposed. Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-1-203. Under the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, each party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or 
purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right 
to receive the fruits of the contract. A violation of the covenant gives rise 
to a claim for breach of contract. 
An examination of express contract terms alone is insufficient to 
determine whether there has been a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. To comply with his obligation to perform a 
contract in good faith, a party's actions must be consistent with the agreed 
common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party. The 
purpose, intentions, and expectations of the parties should be determined 
by considering the contract language and the course of dealings between 
and conduct of the parties.117 
Clearly, any duty of good faith is defined by the "agreed common purpose" of the 
executed contract. No such "agreed common purpose" was present in this case until the 
August 22, 1986 contract was signed. No valid contract existed prior to that time. 
Absent a valid contract, no covenant of good faith existed under St. Benedict's 
Development and therefore, there was no duty of good faith and fair dealing prior to 
contract formation. 
b811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) 
'Id. at 199-200 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). 
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B. Won-Door Did Not Breach Any Duty of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing Under the August 22, 1986 Agreement. 
Republic's claim for a fee is further precluded by its conduct and the terms of the 
August 22, 1986 Agreement which it agreed to. At the meeting on August 22, 1986, Bird 
and McSwain asked Watkins what other companies Watkins was dealing with. Watkins 
told Bird and McSwain that it was none of their business. This was because the list of 
qualified buyers had already been established by Republic on May 21, 1986. Bird and 
McSwain thereafter executed the August 22,1986 agreement on behalf of Republic. The 
agreement names eleven potential purchasing companies (including Republic) for which 
Republic might have received a fee, if the designated companies bought all of Won-
Door's stock. 
After naming the eleven potential buyer companies, the August 22, 1986 
agreement provides, "Other than above, Republic Group entitled to no fee." Neither 
Thermal Systems, Inc. nor TS Industries is mentioned in the August 22,1986 agreement; 
nor by reference m the May 21, 1986 letter. Each of the matters asserted by Republic 
as a breach of this duty were matters that allegedly occurred prior to the formation of 
the Agreement on August 22, 1986. Therefore, Republic has no cause of action for 
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
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V. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON REPUBLICS CLAIM FOR FRAUD 
A. Watkins Had No Duty to Speak. 
Republic has asserted the presence of a confidential trust relationship with 
defendants which allegedly imposed upon defendants a duty to speak. Republic has also 
contended throughout its argument that Watkins was the agent of Won-Door. Under 
these circumstances it is hard to understand how plaintiff can argue that Watkins, as 
attorney and agent for Won-Door, had a special confidential relationship with plaintiff. 
It is well established from the law that an agent's sole loyalty must be to his principal. 
"An agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal 
in all matters connected with his agency."118 
Plaintiff has cited no case or other authority for the proposition that a party 
dealing with an attorney and agent for an opposing party can rely on or expect to be in 
a confidential relationship with or to be owed a duty of loyalty by the attorney/agent for 
the opposing party. The alleged friendship between Bird and Watkins does not destroy 
the agency relationship between Watkins and Won-Door, nor does it entitle plaintiff to 
any special duties or tieatment. 
Restatement (Second) Agency, § 387. 
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Utah has found the presence of a confidential relationship when "one party, 
having gained the trust and confidence of another, exercises extraordinary influence over 
the other party."119 In Von Hake v. Thomas, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is a question of fact and "rests upon the principle of inequality between 
the parties and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the 
parties over the other. Mere confidence in one person by another is not 
sufficient alone to constitute such a relationship. The confidence must be 
reposed by one under such circumstances as to create a corresponding 
duty, either legal or moral, upon the part of the other to observe the 
confidence, and it must result in a situation where as a matter of fact there 
is superior influence on one side and dependence on the other.120 
In the present case, both Republic and defendants were experienced businessmen 
acting in a commercial transaction. Watkins and Won-Door had no duty to Republic 
to disclose any of the confidential information regarding its contract with Boettcher 
because no special relationship existed between them. To have done so would have 
exposed Won-Door to liability for breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing under 
its contract with Boettcher. Therefore, Watkins' absolute refusal to tell Bird and 
McSwain on August 22, 1986 the names of any companies he was dealing with, and the 
execution of the agreement by Bird and McSwain eliminates any possible reliance by 
Republic under its fraud claim. 
In the case of Hurley v. Kallof,121 the Arizona Court of Appeals decided a case 
involving a commission sought for the same piece of real estate when the buyer had 
^Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). 
°Id. at 769. 
1
 409 P.2d 730 (Ariz.App.1966) 
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employed two different brokers. The court stated, "To require the seller to inform other 
brokers of each and every turn in the negotiations would not be in accord with everyday 
business procedures."122 The court held that because the second broker was the only 
broker carrying on active negotiations with the eventual buyer, and because the first 
buyer had allowed negotiations between it and the eventual buyer to fall through, the 
first broker was not entitled to a commission.123 "A broker must be diligent and 
remain informed of the status of his listing through his own efforts. When he neglects 
to do this he may not then complain when another broker in a competitive market closes 
the sale."124 
Based upon Hurley, Won-Door had no duty to keep Republic informed of the 
progress of the Boettcher sale of the Won-Door stock. Accordingly, when the Boettcher 
contract is considered, Watkins was not only justified in not disclosing any details 
regarding Won-Door's contract with Boettcher, he had a duty not to speak. 
B. Any Allegedly Omitted Fact Would Have Made No Difference. 
Republic incorrectly claims that Watkins committed fraud by failing to disclose 
who it was dealing with. This argument is misplaced because Republic had already 
picked its list of ten qualified contacts on May 21, 1986. Doug Parry's letter of August 
20, 1986, which attempted to resolve the fee issue on behalf of Republic, referred to this 
same list. This list could not be changed at will. To do so would have subjected 
i 2 2 i d . 
i 2 3 i d . 
i 2 4 i d . 
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Defendants to liability for breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing under its 
contract with Boettcher, who earned and was paid a commission on the sale to TS 
Industries, Inc. Watkins was therefore, absolutely correct when he refused to disclose 
the names of any companies with whom he was dealing. As a result, the claimed 
omission is totally immaterial. 
C. Watkins Made No Misrepresentation. 
There is no evidence in the record that any of the Defendants made any 
misrepresentation. Indeed, the only person whom Republic claims made 
misrepresentations is Watkins. The case against Watkins is barred by the bankruptcy 
proceedings which are the subject of a Motion to Dismiss presently before this court. 
Furthermore, Defendants strongly believe that Watkins did nothing wrong and that he 
did not make any misrepresentation. Republic has alleged that defendants committed 
fraud by repeatedly assuring Republic that it did not need a contract and by not 
informing Republic of negotiations with TS Industries, Inc. Republic claims that 
Watkins, when asked about who he was dealing with other than Leucadia said it was not 
a company on Republic's list. 
In Utah to sustain a claim of fraud based upon an affirmative statement, the 
following elements must be established:125 
1. a representation; 
2. concerning a presently existing material fact; 
125Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952); 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). 
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3. which was false; 
4. which the representor either 
a. knew to be false, or 
b. made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such representation; 
5. for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; 
6. that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 
7. did in fact rely upon it; 
8. was thereby induced to act; 
9. to his injury and damage. 
If any element is missing, the claim must fail. In this case, there was 
no false statement of a presently existing material fact because TS Industries, Inc., one 
of the companies Won-Door was dealing with, was not on the list of qualified contacts. 
Indeed, it was not on any list provided by Republic. Also, it appears that another 
principal deficiency in Republic's claim is that there was no justifiable reliance by 
Republic. Bird's continual efforts to get a contract demonstrate that he knew one was 
necessary. Bird testified repeatedly about the continuous and heated dispute with 
Watkins during the whole period of time and about Republic's refusal to accept anything 
but a written contract. 
At the meeting of August 22, 1986 when the handwritten agreement was signed, 
Watkins specifically refused to tell Bird and McSwain with whom he was dealing and 
said that it was none of their business. This was justified because there was no 
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agreement at that time between Republic and Won-Door, because the list of qualified 
contacts was already established back on May 21, 1986, and because to disclose any 
information may have breached Won-Door's duty to Boettcher. Bird and McSwain on 
behalf of Republic then signed the agreement. Thus, there clearly could not be any 
reliance. In regard to almost all of the required elements, Republic's claim of fraud is 
amply refuted by Bird's own testimony. 
VI. 
REPUBLICS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS MOOTED BY THE COURTS GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS 
The relief sought by Republic's motion for partial summary judgment is the mirror 
image of the relief granted to defendants. Because the trial court properly granted 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, as shown by this Brief, Republic's appeal on 
this issue is not well taken, and the trial court's order should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts, taken in the light most favorable to Republic, demonstrate 
that Judge Daniels properly granted summary judgment in Defendants' favor and denied 
Republic's motion for partial summary judgment. The undisputed facts are based largely 
upon the sworn testimony of Republic's own key witness, Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 
Defendants respectfully request this Court to affirm the trial court's judgment 
granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Republic's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
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WON-DOOR Corporation JAY A. SMART Prc*tdent/Bo*xxi Oxairsiaja 
SSSSpSra^ 
-<? * ' ^ > i r ^ ^ <7# 1865 South 3480 West/Salt Lake City, Utah 84104/(801} 973-7500 
February 20, 1986 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
The Directors and Shareholders of WON-DOOR 
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, have adopted a plan 
to raise funding through either an initial public 
offering or a private placement, of common stock. 
Mr. Reed A. Watkins, Attorney-at-Law, is the 
exclusive agent and representative of the Corporation 
and its shareholders for this purpose. Mr- Watlcins 
'is fully authorized and empowered to negotiate and 
conclude the funding transaction on behalf of*the 
Corporation and its shareholders. 
<i MLLL. 
Jay A. Smart-' 
EXHIBIT" A 
LAW OFFICES OF 
W A T K I N S S FA/BER 
^ L f - ^ f ^ - 1 ^
 Tr fv 2102 EAST 3300 SOUTH 
ftWETH DOUCLO W/JXJNi 
&wu>LHoocaos SAO* LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 0 9 
B«AN V. BUXNITT p^j
 8 0 J 486-563^ 
March 12, 1986 
Mr. I rv in D. Bird, J r . 
The Republic Group 
185 South Main St ree t 
Sui te 1050 
Sa l t Lake Ctiy, Utah 84111 
Re: Itfbn-Dcor Corporation 
Dear I r v : 
This letter will confirm our understanding of a fee arrangement 
should The Republic Group through its contacts fund a private place-
ment of Vfon-Door Cbrporation stock. 
The airount of the finding is $7,392,000 for 176,000 shares of the 
Won-Dcor stock. This is corputed at $42.00 per share. Members of the 
Smart family are the sellers. 
Wen-Door will have 800,000 shares outstanding (all camun and 
of one class) after completion of the funding. The 176,000 shares 
represents twenty-two (22%) percent thereof. VJbn-Door is adjusting 
its executive bonus plan which will result in increased corporate 
earnings over the amount set forth in the Selected Pro Fbnra Financial 
Information. Won-Door anticipates is June 30, 1986 after-tax earnings 
to be not less than $2,688,000. 
It is Von-Dcor's intent to becrme a public crnpany within a five 
year period. 
Upon caipletion and execution of such funding arrangerrent with The 
Republic Group's contact(s), a cormission of $250,000 will be paid to 
The Republic Group. The Republic Group will bear its cwn costs. Tto 
avoid misunderstanding regarding contacts, names should be submitted 
and their status qualified in advance. 
Truly Yours, 
Reed" 
TW/bt
 EXHIBIT " J L 
tEUpe ffizpublic d rmtp 
May 21, .1986 
Reed A. Watkins 
Watkins & Faher 
2102 E. 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Dear Reed, 
This letter serves as formal notice to you of our list of prospective 
buyers for the Won Dcor Corporation. 
1. Wes Pay Corp, 
2. Capital Consultants Inc. 
3. The Republic Group 
4. The Dallas Corp. 
5. Leucadia Inc. 
6. Weyerhaeuser Corp. 
7. Masco 
8. Peachtree Dcor, A Division of Indal Corp, 
9. Armstrong World Corp. 
10. Teledyne Corp. 
11. Dcminick & Daninick 
We appreciate your desixe to vaork with us and hope that you know that v^ 
are working diligently to effect the sale of your client fs caipany. 
Personal Regards, 
Frederick W. Volcansek 
Vice President 
The Recublic Grouo 
cc: Bryant D. Cragun 
Irvin D. Bird Jr. 
Mark E. McSwain 
IW/stc 
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D. THANK W t L X I N 3 
or COUNSEL 
August 20 , 198 6 
Reed r. ~ 
Watkin< i — •*-
2102 East 3300 Sout 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Dear Mr, Watkins: 
RE: The Republic Group/Won-Door 
I am writing in confirmation of our telephone 
conversation of last week and your assurance that you 
recognized your obligation to The Republic Group if Leucadia or 
any of the other qualified ten listed companies acquires an 
interest in Won-Door, 
I h a v e r e. v i e w e d the d o c u m e n t s a n d t h i s m a 11 e r w i t h 11: !/ 
Bird and after confirmation with you, my undertanding is that: 
If one of the qualified companies, including Leucadia, 
purchases an interest in Won-Door, The Republic Group 
is entitled to a commission. The commission is based 
on a fee of $250,000 per 22% of Won-Door purchased, 
thus if 100% of Won-Door is purchased by one of the 
qualified corporations then The Republ I c Group should 
be entitled to a $1,000,000 fee. 
If that does not comport with your understanding I would 
appreciate hearing immediately so that I can discuss this 
matter with my client. 
My understanding is that Leucadia has been negotiating 
very seriously with Won-Door and. that last week after examining 
the books they made an offer. If this offer is accepted The 
Republic Group would be entitled to its fees. 
EXHIBIT fc^ 
Reed A 
Page 2 
August: 5 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter . j win 
assure my client that there is no misunderstanding o i tl i-
agreement. 
0008p 
/vfi.i/^rtir> ; v. ,,, ... w 
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Boettcher& Company 
M l M i k a i W 
828 Seventeentfc Mr«<* A p r i l 2 8 , 1 9 8 6 
P.O. Box 54 * 
Denver, Colorado 80201-0OS4 
(303) 828-8000 
11 Jay Jmar, 
Chairmai 
Won-Door Corporation 
1865 South 3480 West 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , t l i a i 8 4 1 0 4 
Df=ar I i : 
The purpose ot this letter is to contiim i writing the 
understanding between Boettcher & Company, Inc. ("Boettcher") and 
Won-Door, Corporation (nthe Company") whereby Boettcher will act 
as exclusive representative for the Company to arrange and to 
negotiate, on such terms as may be acceptable ti the Board of 
Directors of the Company, and subject to the approval of the 
Stockholders of the Company, if necessary or appropriate, a 
possible transaction with an appropriate third party concerning 
either: 
(i the salt of a 11 or a portion of the outstanding stock ni 
assets of the Company# i 
( i| the acquisiti mt consolidation r? merger t the company 
Our arrangeiiiHi 
as follows: 
| | | 1 ( i f jL J . i e r e w j L t J 1 s J l a J ^ JDe 
1) Boettcher shall commence itJ activity tollowing 
acceptance and approval of this agreement by fhe 
Company* 
2) Boettcher .shall work with the Company in the preparation 
of a memorandum (the "Offering Memoranaum ). This 
Offering Memorandum will describe and analyze the 
Company, its operations, management, current financial 
datl and other appropriate information. The °«ering 
Memorandum will be used m discussions wit £ Prospective 
purchasers and its form and content shall be f u ° ^ t fco 
approval by the Company. Subject to the terms hereof, 
S S Company and Boettcher shall have ^unrestricted 
riaht to use the Offering Memorandum during the term ot 
this agreement The Company understands and confirm. 
Jay Smart 
H ?8f 1986 - PM.JP Trfn 
(.1) that Boettcher will be using and relying on data, 
material and information presented in the Offering Memorandum 
furnished to Boettcher by the Company and its employees and 
representatives and (ii) that Boettcher does not. assume 
responsibility for independently verifying the information in 
the Offering Memorandum. The Company hereby represents and 
warrants to Boettcher that the Offering Memorandum as 
approved by the Company will not contain any untrue statement 
of a material fact or omit to state any material fact 
necessary to make the statements ther-in :v r misleading. 
.••oettcher understands the confidential nature OL -rAs project 
and will work with you to maintain tn^ confidentiality you 
require. If any companies, entities, or individuals should 
be excluded as potential purchasers due to the 
confidentiality of the information, the Company shall 
promptly notify Boettcher in writing of these exclusions, 
Except for such stated exclusions and the exclusion specified 
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be allowed tc distribute the 
Offering Memorandum to any party that it reasonably deems to 
be a prospective purchaser of the Company• All 
correspondence from Boettcher to the Company related to the 
transaction -shall be marked "Confidential" and delivered to 
Reed Watkins as attorney for the Company. 
Boettcher shall act as your representative on an exclusive 
basis for a period of four months from the date of the 
acceptance of this letter by you unless extended by mutual 
consent. Boettcher shall take reasonable and diligent action 
to complete the sale of the Company on a timely basis and 
agrees to give the Company bi-weekly oral updates of its 
activities and progress. In this role, except as discussed 
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be the sole and exclusive 
representative of the company in connection with any 
negotiations or discussion with any person or entity 
concerning any sale and any other acquisition/ consolidation 
or merger of the stock or assets of the Company. In order 
that Boettcher can best coordinate efforts to effect the 
transaction satisfactorily to the Company during the terms of 
our retention hereunder, the Company agrees to initiate any 
discussions looking toward a possible sale, acquisitionr 
consolidation or merger only through Boettcher. In the even! 
the Company receives inquiries concerning the type of 
transaction dealt with in this letter, you will promptly so 
inform us when you become aware of such inquiry. In the 
event that a proposed person or entity with whom you 
eventually crclud^ "" agreement is referred to us by 
Mr. Jay Smart 
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another party, all compensation due such party, which 
Boettcher has expressly agreed in writing to pay, shall be 
our responsibility. The" Company will be responsible for any 
fees or commissions of any other type, including financial, 
legal, accounting or other advisers called upon, requested or 
retained by the Company, its officers, directors or 
Stockholders, and the Company agrees to pay all of its 
expenses in connection with any such transaction. 
5) Except as set forth in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall receive a 
fee for its services, which to the extent necessary will 
include but not be limited to, participation in the 
preparation of the Offering Memorandum, identification of a 
selling price acceptable to the seller, development of a 
marketing plan, a search for and screening of responsible 
purchasers, advising you as to the financial aspects of the 
proposed transaction, and assisting you in the negotiations 
between you and the prospective -purchasers.- This- fee shall 
be based on the "Purchase Price" and payable from the Company 
in the event of an asset sale, merger, or acquisition or 
similar transaction of the Company, or from the Stockholders 
in the event of a stock sale, as follows: 
U) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
•5% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
any 
any 
any 
any 
any 
amount 
amount 
amount 
amount 
amount 
upto-$999,999;-
from $1,000,000 
from $2,000,000 
from $3,000,000 
over $4,000,000. 
plus 
to $1,999,999; 
to $2,999,999; 
to $3,999,999; 
» 
plus 
plus 
plus 
For purposes of this agreement, the Purchase Price shall^ 
include cash, securities, and any corporate earnout received. 
by the Company or the Stockholders. If any portion of the 
Purchase Price is in the form of debt securities or stock, 
then that amount of the Purchase Price shall be based upon 
the fair market value of the debt.or equity securities. The 
fair market value of equity securities shall be determined as 
follows: If any of the securities to be^received are traded 
on a registered national exchange the fair market value of 
such securities shall be the closing bid price for such 
securities on the registered national exchange providing the 
primary or largest market in such securities on the last 
trading day prior to the day the sale is consummated; if any 
of the securities to be received are not traded on a 
Mr* Jay Smart 
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shall be the average of the closing bid prices as reported by 
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. for the 
previous ten consecutive trading days prior to the day the 
sale is consummated* 
"Earnout shall be defined as any cash, securities, or other 
remuneration received as a result of the future performance 
of the Company, or as a result of any noncompete, consulting, 
or similar agreements entered into by any stockholder as a 
result of the sale* 
The final Purchase Price and all other terms and conditions 
of any transaction shall be subject to approval of the Board 
of directors and, if appropriate, the Stockholders of the 
Company, '
 9^ 'JVC? 
/ 
6) The Company has previously contacted certain compani* 
through other intermediaries regarding a possible s^le of or 
investment in the Company, The names of these entities shall 
be provided in writing to Boettcher within £**^Dusiness days 
of acceptance of this letter and shall not exceed ten 
companies* In the event a transaction of the type 
contemplated herein is completed with one of these parties, 
Boettcher shall receive a fee of $25,000 for services 
rendered* In all other cases, Boettcher shall act as the^ 
exclusive representative of the Company and if a transaction 
is completed with any entity not provided, Boettcher shall be 
entitled to the fees specified in paragraph 5. The Company 
agrees it will not provide any information prepared by 
Boettcher to these parties* 
7) Subject to paragraph 10 below, the fees to Boettcher shall be 
payable only if a transaction is closed, and shall be payable 
in cash in full at the closing of any such transaction, 
provided that any payments which are based on future earnings 
or other "earnout" formulas shall be paid to Boettcher at the 
time the future payments are received. Any such amounts 
shall be added to any amount previously paid in determining 
the Purchase Price and applying the above percentage fee. 
8) Except as specifically stated in paragraph 10 of this# (?0$ 
agreement, the above-described compensation shall be in fulj^-
payment for all services rendered by Boettcher & Company^'Snd, 
in no event, and regardless of whether or not there is a 
closing, shall the Company be liable for any out-of-pocket 
expenses, or for the services of others whom Boettcher may 
employ to assist in the transaction. 
Mr. Jay Smart 
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9) After termination of this agreement for any reason, Boettcher 
will provide you with the list of names of parties we have 
contacted and with whom we have had discussions on your 
behalf. If within 12 months following the termination of the 
agreement, the Company consummates a transaction with any 
party which is stated on the aforementioned list, Boettcher 
shall be entitled to its full fee as set forth in this 
agreement. 
This agreement may be terminated by the Company on the one 
hand, or by Boettcher on the other hand, at any time by 
written notice. In the event of the termination of this 
agreement by the Company and the Stockholders together prior 
to the four month period referred to in paragraph 4, the 
Company shall reimburse'Boettcher for all its direct, .out-of-
pocket expenses incurred in connection with this transaction; 
provided, however, if Boettcher becomes* entitled to a fee 
Jind&r paragraphs 9fof this agreement, credit against that fee 
shall be given for any fee paid and expenses reimbursed 
pursuant to this paragraph. Such payment of out-of-pocket 
expenses shall be due and payable within three days after 
notification by Boettcher to the Company to the amount of 
expenses incurred. 
11) In connection with the performance of the services described 
in this letter and any transaction which may arise as a 
result of such services, the Company agrees to indemnify 
Boettcher, its officers, employees and agents, and each 
person, if any, who controls Boettcher within the meaning of 
the Federal securities laws, harmless against and from any 
and all losses, claims, expenses, damages or liabilities to 
which Boettcher or any such 'officer, employee, agent or 
person becomes subject in connection with the transaction and 
services referred to in this agreement under any of the 
Federal or State securities laws or any other statute or 
common law or otherwise and to reimburse Boettcher and any 
such officer, agent, employee or person .for any legal or 
other expenses (including the cost of separate counsel and 
any related investigation and preparation) incurred by 
Boettcher and any such officer, employee, -agent or person 
arising out of or in connection herewith, whether cr not 
resulting in any liability insofar as such losses, claims, 
damages, expenses or liabilities arise out of or are based 
upon any untrue statement or alleged untrue statement of a 
material fact contained in the Offering Memorandum, or 
otherwise made by the Company, or arise out of or are based 
upon the omission or alleged omission to state a material 
fact required to be stated or necessary in order to make the 
Mr* Jay Smart 
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12) It is understood that if any transaction is completed, 
Boettcher shall be entitled, at its expense, to*place an 
announcement in such newspapers and periodicals as we desire, 
stating that Boettcher has acted as financial advisers in 
such transaction. Any such announcement shall be in a fo 
reasonably acceptable to the Company-
If the foregoing represents a correct statement of our 
agreement and understanding, please execute this agreement. If 
executed and delivered to Boettcher, a binding agreement shall 
thereupon exist. 
Very truly yours, 
BOETTCHER & COMPANY, INC, 
C-^Tame^'Bode 
Vice President 
Corporate Finance Department 
G. Michael Moore 
Senior Vice President 
Corporate Finance Department 
The above is hereby acknowledged 
and accepted: 
WON-DOOR CORPORATION 
SA<JU<3jt^^ 
Office: A44e*oi y-
Date: 
r—- — c r-: .~z~':. tr.c. 
*4 -, .. T » ) -i o p £, 
i-iu . JL -^  / -L -/ C v.1 
Fred Vclcansek 
The Republic Group 
1S5 South State, Suite 1050 
?rtlt '--A- ^ ity, UT 84115 
r Tree: 
Ky ten choices £•::••: selling eon-I-v/or would be the following 
in* • "J * • •• . *•.•- .• . .- ;u — > /-\ * 
3. o e v e r ^ ^ n b u y - o u r ; w h e r e r h e f o u r n f u s p u t t o g e t h e r 
— "ic* ~%<ni^ ~ w*** ^ i 11 I*"*b"*m end Z cemtj m cind r a i s e t h e 
7"..« vt-i.v UII(.:CJIIIr<jr t a b l e wi. i.l• i.he i i s i . <M cioniurinies c h a c 
^ :iuv-: c h o s e n c.-**Iy L c c ^ u s e I know s o l i t t l e ah-i-un t h e i n d u s t r y 
r: ; !^ • . - .^C: -*J :J u.c-*rx t-;xo Jioova L.O D o - . r . i . * . x u u u v z-w:::— c : i a i V 3 t vviiO 
d o e s . 
O. v- -uw 
2. .^ .-.SCG C o r j . 
3 . vji.m rrdl Ler Gor1"**. 
i * «- JL. W - . 
. ' -. T T T ^ T f i : i ; 
I v* * i be in Icsho a:: "** .ir-nday and *:iil be back en 
7ue--ay ..3i\.-ing. I would 1\-- •;•:• visit witn you, Irv, and ;•:-.- .. 
at ±':i?.z tir.v:-. 
V«riy truly yours, 
EXHIBIT *. H 
Capital Consultant*. Inc. 
May 23, 1986 
Kevin Shultz 
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Incorporated 
131 South Rodeo Drive, Suite 300 
Beverly Hills, CA 90212 
Dear Kevin: 
Tuesday morning, Irv Bird and I met with Reed Watkins to determine 
his sales approach for Won-Door Corporation. It was considerably disappoint-
ing to us that Reed had decided to pursue Boettcher and Company. Both Irv 
and I tried to dissuade Reed of this decision but it was to no avail. 
Reed decided that the time factor you and I had discussed was 
inopportune. Furthermore, Boettcher had completed its due diligence and had 
already prepared its offering memorandum. Therefore, Boettcher was prepared 
to begin sales efforts immediately. 
He conceded that we were correct in our assessment that Drexel 
Burnham had far greater credentials and success in these types of projects; 
but he said that he was only giving Boettcher 90 days to perform and should 
they fail to perform, he would come back to Drexel Burnham. 
Both Irv and I reminded Reed of your comment regarding a shopped 
property, but he has made his mind up for the present time. We hope that 
you will understand the situation. We were so pleased with our meeting and 
hope that you agree with our feeling that there is ground for future 
business between our organizations. 
We will keep you apprised of the progress with Won-Door. Should 
you have any suggestions that you feel would be beneficial to all of us, 
we would be most appreciative. 
Kindest personal regards, 
CAPITAL CONSULTANTS, INC. 
Brfyant/ D. Cragun, 
President 
EXHIBIT" -L " BDC/dhs 
cc: Irvin D. Bird 
Rule 55 UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE 498 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can hy computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claim-
ants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain-
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. . 
February 20, 1986 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
The Directors and Shareholders of WON-DOOR 
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, have adopted a plan 
to raise funding through either an initial public 
offering or a private placement of common stock, 
Mr, Reed A. Watkins, Attorney-at-Law, is the 
exclusive agent and representative of the Corporation 
and its shareholders for this purpose, Mr, Watkins 
is fully authorized and empowered to negotiate and 
conclude the funding transaction on behalf of the 
Corporation and its shareholders. 
EXHIBIT - -A 
Lw OFFICES OF 
W A T K I N S S F A / B E R 
» ! ^ ? S « m 2'02 "^ 330°5outH 
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^ ! £ S £ PHONE 80. -86-5634 
Mardi 12, 1986 
Mr. Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 
The Bepublic Group 
185 South Main Street 
Suite 1050 
Salt Lake Ctiy, Utah 84111 
Be: Wbn-Dcor Corporation 
Dear Irv: 
This letter will conf ix» cur « ™ a S ^ f y ^ ^ c ! 
should The Bepublic Group througn i ts contacts rum a
 P 
msnt of Vfon-Door Corporation stock. 
<- ^ X._J- ; c c7 w 000 for 176,000 shares of the 
The anount of the funding i s $7'392,00U ior , i ^ ^ s
 o f the 
Won-Dcor stock. This i s coipited at $42.00 per share. 
Snart family are the se l lers . 
Hcn-Dcor w i l l have 800,000 f ™ ^ g S ^ g . ^ , S T S a S 
of one class) after completion of f ^ ^ ^ ^ r i s adjusting 
represents twenty-two (22%) percent t h e r e o f ^ r e S U corporate 
i t s executive bonus plan which ^ . ^ f - S ^ S pro fornTrinancial 
earniixjs over the artount j e t far* £ j ^ e 30?1986 after-tax earnings 
Information. Won-Dcor anticipates i s June JU, ^ 
to be not less than $2,688,000. 
I t i s Wbn-Door's intent to becor* a public cncsny within a f ive 
year period. 
Upon cc*pletion and execution of ******* ™ ^ £ * £ £ * 
BepubSc Group's contact<s), » ? » S * ^ » g g S ' £ £ c w n ^ o s t T To 
The Republic Group. The ^ ^ c J ^ ^ 1 ^ ^ j ^ u l d be submitted 
avoid misunderstaming regarding contacts, names sno 
and their status qualified in advance. 
"Truly Yours, 
PW/bt 
Reed" A. Watkins 
EXHIBIT" 
W^ ^kpuhlic d rnup 
Way 21, .1986 
Heed A. Watkins 
Watkins & Faber 
2102 E. 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Dear Reed, 
This letter serves as formal notice to you of our list of prospective 
buyers for the Won Dcor Corporation. 
1. Wes Kay Corp. 
2. Capital Consultants Inc. 
3. The Republic Group 
4. The Dallas Corp. 
5. Leucadia Inc. 
6. Weyerhaeuser Corp. 
7. Masco 
8. Peachtree Door, A Division of Indal Corp. 
9. Armstrong World Corp. 
10. Teledyne Corp. 
11. Daninick & Daninick 
We appreciate your desire to work with us and hope that you knew that we 
are working diligently to effect the sale of your client !s ccrpany. 
Personal Regards, 
Frederick W. Volcansek 
Vice President 
The Recublic Grouo 
cc: Bryant D. Cragun 
Irvin D. Bird Jr. 
Mark E. McSwain 
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August 20, 1986 
Reed A. Watkins, Esq, 
Watkins & Faber 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
RE: The Republic Group/Won-Door 
Dear Mr, Watkins: 
I am writing in confirmation of our telephone 
conversation of last week and your assurance that you 
recognized your obligation to The Republic Group if Leucadia or 
any of the other qualified ten listed companies acquires an 
interest in Won-Door. 
I have reviewed the documents and this matter with Irv 
Bird and after confirmation with you, my undertanding is that: 
If one of the qualified companies, including Leucadia, 
purchases an interest in Won-Door, The Republic Group 
is entitled to a commission. The commission is based 
on a fee of $250,000 per 22% of Won-Door purchased, 
thus if 100% of Won-Door is purchased by one of the 
qualified corporations then The Republic Group should 
be entitled to a $1,000,000 fee. 
If that does not comport with your understanding I would 
appreciate hearing immediately so that I can discuss this 
matter with my client. 
My understanding is that Leucadia has been negotiating 
very seriously with Won-Door and that last week after examining 
the books they made an offer. If this offer is accepted The 
Republic Group would be entitled to its fees. 
OAMICL L. SCftMAN 
PATRICIA A. OROAKC 
DOUGLAS J PAARY 
PCGCY A. 70M3IC 
• LAKC S. ATKIM 
THOMAS A. MITCHCUL 
C V L J I O I T «* 
Reed A. Watkins, Esq. 
Page 2 
August 20, 1986 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will 
assure my client that there is no misunderstanding on the 
agreement. 
DJP:cc 
0008D 
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Boettcher & Company 
ntaMNMhstmt A p r i l 2 8 , 1986 
Dttmt, Colorado 80201-0*** 
(303) G2S-8OQ0 
Mr. Jay Smart 
Chairman 
Won-Door Corporation 
1865 South 3480 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Dear Jay: 
The purpose of this letter is to confirm in writing the 
understanding between Boettcher & Company, Inc. ("Boettcher") and 
Won-Door Corporation ("the Company") whereby Boettcher will act 
as exclusive representative for the Company to arrange and to 
negotiate, on such terms as may be "acceptable to the Board of 
Directors of the Company, and subject to the approval of the 
Stockholders of the Company, if necessary or appropriate, a 
possible transaction with an appropriate third party concerning 
either: 
(i) the sale of all or a portion of the outstanding stock or 
assets of the Company, or 
(ii) the acquisition, consolidation or merger of the company. 
Our arrangements with you in connection therewith shall be 
as follows: 
1) Boettcher shall commence its activity following 
acceptance and approval of this agreement by the 
Company, 
2) Boettcher shall work with the Company in the preparation 
of a memorandum (the "Offering Memorandum"). This 
Offering Memorandum will describe and analyze the 
Company, its operations, management, current financial 
data and other appropriate information. The Offering 
Memorandum will be used in discussions with prospective 
purchasers and its form and content shall be subject to 
approval by the Company. Subject to the terms hereof, 
the Company and Boettcher shall have the unrestricted 
right to use the Offering Memorandum during the term of 
this agreement. The Company understands and confirms 
Mr. Jay Smart 
April 28, 1986 - Page Two 
(.i) tnax: noenrcner win De using and relying on data, 
material and information presented in the Offering Memorandum 
furnished to Boettcher by the Company and its employees and 
representatives and (ii) that Boettcher does not*assume 
responsibility for independently verifying the information in 
the Offering Memorandum. The Company hereby represents and 
warrants to Boettcher that the Offering Memorandum as 
approved by the Company will not contain any untrue statement 
of a material fact or omit to state any material fact 
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. 
3) Boettcher understands the confidential nature of this project 
and will work with you to maintain the confidentiality you 
require. If any companies, entities, or individuals should 
be excluded as potential purchasers due to the 
confidentiality of the information, the Company shall 
promptly notify Boettcher in writing of these exclusions. 
Except for such stated exclusions and the exclusion specified 
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be allowed tc distribute the 
Offering Memorandum to any party that it reasonably deems to 
be a prospective purchaser of the Company. All 
correspondence from Boettcher to the Company related to the. 
transaction shall be marked-"Confidential" and delivered to 
Reed Watkins as attorney for the Company. 
4) Boettcher shall act as your representative on an exclusive 
basis for a period of four months from the date of the 
acceptance of this letter by you unless extended by mutual 
consent. Boettcher shall take reasonable and diligent action 
to complete the sale of the Company on a timely basis and 
agrees to give the Company bi-weekly oral updates of its 
activities and progress. In this role, except as discussed 
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be the sole and exclusive 
representative of the company in connection with any 
negotiations or discussion with any person or entity 
concerning any sale and any other acquisition, consolidation 
or merger of the stock or assets of the Company. In order 
that Boettcher can best coordinate efforts to effect the 
transaction satisfactorily to the Company during the terms of 
our retention hereunder, the Company agrees to initiate any 
discussions looking toward a possible sale, acquisition, 
consolidation or merger only through Boettcher. In the event 
the Company receives inquiries concerning the type of 
transaction dealt with in this letter, you will promptly so 
inform us when you become aware of such inquiry. In the 
event that a proposed person or entity with whom you 
eventually conclude an agreement is referred to us by 
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another party, all compensation due such party, which 
Boettcher has expressly agreed in writing to pay, shall be 
our responsibility. The Company will be responsible for any 
fees or commissions of any other type, including financial, 
legal, accounting or other advisers called upon, requested or 
retained by the- Company, its officers, directors or 
Stockholders, and the Company agrees to pay all of its 
expenses in connection with any such transaction. 
b] Except as set forth in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall receive a 
fee for its services, which to the extent necessary will 
include but not be limited to, participation in the 
preparation of the Offering Memorandum, identification of a 
selling price acceptable to the seller, development of a 
marketing plan, a search for and screening of responsible 
purchasers, advising you as to the financial aspects of the 
proposed transaction, and assisting you in the negotiations 
between you and the prospective -purchasers.- This fee shall 
be based on the "Purchase Price" and payable from the Company 
in the event of an asset sale, merger, or acquisition or 
similar transaction of the Company, or from the Stockholders 
in the event of a stock sale, as follows: 
(i) -5% of any amount up to V yyr1, JJ9; ( Las 
(ii) 4* of any amount from $1,000,000 (3 $1,999,999; plus 
(iii) ]l of any amount from $2,000,000 > n $2f999#999; plus 
( i \ i » of any amount from $3, i n UiM ? 3 , H ^ , jq<J; plus 
(v) H of any amount over $4,000,000, 
For purposes of this agreement, the Purchase Price shall^ 
include cash, securities, and any corporate earnout received. 
by the Company or the Stockholders. If any portion of the 
Purchase Price is in the form of debt securities or stock, 
then that amount of the Purchase Price shall be based upon 
the fair market value of the debt .or equity securities. The 
fair market value of equity securities shall be determined as 
follows: If any of the securities to be received are traded 
on a registered national exchange the fair market value of 
such securities shall be the closing bid price for such 
securities on the registered national exchange providing the 
primary or largest market in such securities on the last 
trading day prior to the day the sale is consummated; if any 
of the securities to be received are not traded on a 
-^^±„U*~^A ***± +-A/^ «r»i A<*^UTx<r*r*a. Knf afo minted in the over—the -
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shall be the average of the closing bid prices as reported by 
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. for the 
previous ten consecutive trading days prior to the day the 
sale is consummated• 
"Earnout shall be defined as any cash, securities, or other 
remuneration received as a result of the future performance 
of the Company, or as a result of any noncompete, consulting, 
or similar agreements entered into by any stockholder as a 
result of the sale. 
The final Purchase Price and all other terms and conditions 
of any transaction shall be subject to approval of the Board 
of directors and, if appropriate, the Stockholders of the 
Company, * $~?£? 
/ 
fi) The Company has previously contacted certain companies-' 
through other intermediaries regarding a possible s^le o± or 
investment in the Company. The names of these a*ftities shall 
be provided in writing to Boettcher within iw^DUsiness days 
of acceptance of this letter and shall not exceed ten 
companies. In the event a transaction of the type 
contemplated herein is completed with one of these parties, 
Boettcher shall receive a fee of $25,000 for services 
rendered. In all other cases, Boettcher shall act as the 
exclusive representative of the Company and if a transaction 
is completed with any entity not provided, Boettcher shall be 
entitled to the fees specified in paragraph 5. The Company 
agrees it will not provide any information prepared by 
Boettcher to these parties, 
7) Subject to paragraph 10 below, the fees to Boettcher shall be 
payable only if a transaction is closed, and shall be payable 
in cash in full at fr-he closing of any such transaction, 
provided that any payments which are based on future earnings 
or other "earnout* formulas shall be paid to Boettcher at the 
time the future payments are received. Any such amounts^ 
shall be added to any amount previously paid in determining 
the Purchase Price and applying the above percentage fee. 
\\ Except as specifically stated in paragraph 10 of this^ ff^$ 
agreement, the above-described compensation shall be in ful^-
payment for all services rendered by Boettcher & Company^^Snd, 
in no event, and regardless of whether or not there is a 
closing, shall the Company be liable for any out-of-pocket 
expenses
 r u for the services of others whom Boettcher may 
employ to assist in the transaction. 
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) After termination of this agreement for any reason, Boettcher 
will provide you with the list of names of parties we have 
contacted and with whom we have had discussions on your 
behalf. If within 12 months following the termination of the 
agreement, the Company consummates a transaction with any 
party which is stated on the aforementioned list, Boettcher 
shall be entitled to its full fee as-set forth in this 
agreement. 
This agreement may be terminated by the Company on the one 
hand, or by Boettcher on the other hand, at any time by 
written notice. In the event of the termination of this 
agreement by the Company and the Stockholders together prior 
to the four month period referred to in paragraph 4, the 
Company shall .reimburse'Boettcher for all its direct, .out-of-
pocket expenses incurred in connection.with this transaction; 
provided, however, if Boettcher becomes*entitled to a fee 
undgx paragraphs 9fof this agreement, credit against that fee 
shall be given for any fee paid and expenses reimbursed 
pursuant to this paragraph. Such payment of out-of-pocket 
expenses shall be due and payable within three days after 
notification by Boettcher to the Company to the amount of 
expenses incurred. 
11) In connection with the performance of the services described 
in this letter and any transaction which may arise as a 
result of such services, the Company agrees to indemnify 
Boettcher, its officers, employees and agents, and each 
person, if any, who controls Boettcher within the meaning of 
the Federal securities laws, harmless against and from any 
and all losses, claims, expenses, damages or liabilities to 
which Boettcher or any such 'officer, employee, agent or 
person becomes subject in connection with the transaction and 
services referred to in this agreement under any of the 
Federal or State securities laws or any other statute or 
common law or otherwise and to reimburse Boettcher and any 
such officer, • agent, employee or person .for any legal or 
other expenses (including the cost of separate counsel and 
any related investigation and preparation) incurred by 
Boettcher and any such officer, employee, -agent or person 
arising out of or in connection herewith, whether cr not 
resulting in any liability insofar as such losses, claims, 
damages, expenses or liabilities arise out of or are based 
upon any untrue statement or alleged untrue statement of a 
material fact contained in the Offering Memorandum, or 
otherwise made by the Company, or arise out of or are based 
upon the omission or alleged omission to state a material 
fact required to be stated or necessary in order to make the 
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12) It is understood that if any transaction is completedf 
Boettcher shall be entitled, at its expense, to-"place an 
announcement in such newspapers and periodicals as we desire. 
stating that Boettcher has acted as financial advisers in 
such transaction. Any such announcement shall be in a form j<~c' 
reasonably acceptable to the Company* 
If the foregoing represents a correct statement of oar 
agreement and understanding, please execute this agreement. If 
executed and delivered to Boettcher, a binding agreement shall 
thereupon exist. 
Very truly yours, 
BOETTCHER & COMPANY, INC. 
C^Tame^ Bode 
Vice President 
Corporate Finance Department 
$ rf.r-r 
G. Michael Moore 
Senior Vice President 
Corporate Finance Department 
The above is hereby acknowledged 
and accepted: 
WON-DOOR CORPORATION 
By: 
Off ice: /Hle*Ol-U/ 
Date: 
^<£=c= 
i'lu . -• *^  / J. -^  O U 
Fred Vclcansek 
The Republic Group 
185 South State, Suite 1050 
Srtit 7-*A* ritv, TJT 84113 
Fred: 
Kv t en c jy ' joes £•::•£" s e l l i n c "rrOii—T^or would be t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
-j r i . - * • - .-*1- - •• ••* ~ — -: »- •; ^ , -
3, '.-ever^^^o b u v - o u t ; where x.he f o u r <~>r us p u t t o g e t h e r 
z.hc. r;:ndr; n r ~ B i l l I c h c - end I ccrr.c :r. cr.c r a i s e t h e 
7 * ..i Vciv UII«.:CJHI I"(J t t a b l e wi i.n i.he i i s i . tif <:i*iiuurinies cha t 
^ ::uvC chos-in C-AAIV Lc-j-ause I know so l i t t l e an-i-.iv. t h e i n d u s t r y 
d o e s . 
2. .-1.-.SCC Corp . 
3 . *.7i,in 7?d2.Ler Ccr*"*. 
.. *» . - . . * - . . 
CwCr- i i P a c i f i c 
I v i • i be in I d s ho a : : »."•• . ; " d a y and i : i l i be back on 
7 u e - - a y . . o r b i n g . I would l\-\ ::c v i s i t w i tn you, I r v , and ft-. •* -. 
a t J::?.z tir.vi-. 
VT:V t r u l y y o u r s , 
EXHIBIT", n 
Capital Consultants. Inc. 
May 2 3 , 1986 
Kevin Shul tz 
D r e x e l Burnham Lamber t , I n c o r p o r a t e d 
131 South Rodeo D r i v e , S u i t e 300 
Beve r ly H i l l s , CA 90212 
Dear Kevin: 
Tuesday morning, Irv Bird and I met with Reed Watkins to determine 
his sales approach for Won-Door Corporation. It was considerably disappoint-
ing to us that Reed had decided to pursue Boettcher and Company. Both Irv 
and I tried to dissuade Reed of this decision but it was to no avail. 
Reed decided that the time factor you and I had discussed was 
inopportune. Furthermore, Boettcher had completed its due diligence and had 
already prepared its offering memorandum. Therefore, Boettcher was prepared 
to begin sales efforts immediately. 
He conceded that we were correct in our assessment that Drexel 
Burnham had far greater credentials and success in these types of projects; 
but he said that he was only giving Boettcher 90 days to perform and should 
they fail to perform, he would come back to Drexel Burnham. 
Both Irv and I reminded Reed of your comment regarding a shopped 
property, but he has made his mind up for the present time. We hope that 
you will understand the situation. We were so pleased with our meeting and 
hope that you agree with our feeling that there is ground for future 
business between our organizations. 
We will keep you apprised of the progress with Won-Door. Should 
you have any suggestions that you feel would be beneficial to all of us, 
we would be most appreciative. 
Kindest personal regards, 
CAPITAL CONSULTANTS, INC. 
BDC/dhs 
cc: Irvin D. Bird 
Ma r V- U Mr ^ ua T n 
Bryant/ D. Cragun, 
Presidrent 
EXHIBIT". _L 
Rule 55 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4ys 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgmen t . Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claim-
ants . The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain-
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment aga ins t the s tate or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 56. S u m m a r y judgment. 
(a) For claimant . A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending pa r ty . A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. y. 
